THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL STATUTES.
Congressional procedure provides for the printing of a bill
upon its introduction in either house, for its reference to a committee where it is publicly discussed by its friends and oppo.nents and testimony is taken as to its good and bad effects, and
for a report by this committee to the house in which it originated, which usually changes or revises the bill. A special report of those favoring and opposing the bill is sent to each
member of the house, with a copy of the hearings on the bill.
The bill is then placed upon the calendar, and, when reached,
equal time is allotted to its proponents and opponents to discuss
it, at which time the bill is usually amended. It is then engrossed,
as amended, read three times, and voted upon, and, if passed, is
sent to the other house of Congress, where similar action is taken.
Differences between the two houses, if any, are taken up by a
conference committee, composed of members of both houses,
who make a report to their respective houses, which must be
accepted by both houses before the bill is passed. The records
of these proceedings constitute a part of what is generally known
as the "legislative history" of the bill or statute.
In the course of the trial of cases in the courts, or their
presentation before the various and ever-increasing administrative agencies of the government, where the rights of individuals
are at stake, there frequently arise questions either concerning
the objects and purposes of statutory provisions, or concerning
the meaning of the words in which those provisions are set
forth. In such cases the courts or administrative agencies must
either determine by construction the application of the clauses
in dispute, or fix by interpretation the meaning of the words and
phrases in which they are expressed. The words "construction"
and "interpretation" are here used synonymously, as they are today generally so used.
The object of this article is to show to what extent the legislative history of a Federal statute will be considered in its cOnstruction or interpretation.
(158)
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At the outset we are met with the limitation expressed by
Mr. Justice Brown in Hamilton v. Rathbone I in this language:
"The cases are so numerous in this court to the effect that
the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity that an extended review of them is quite unnecessary."
This language was lately reaffirmed by Mr. Justice Day, in delivering the opinion of the court in Caminetti v. United States,2
who said:
"Where the language is plain and admits of no more than
one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the
rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
In two cases 3 the Supreme .Court has referred to the complete legislative history of statutes before it for construction, but
it has been held that the legislative history of an act cannot be
used as a probative force to change the plain meaning of words
which Congress employed in framing it,4 or to create a doubt
where none existed before,5 and that no aid can be derived from
the legislative history of another act passed nearly six years
after the one in question.
The object sought in the interpretation of a law is the intention of the legislature which enacted it. Judge Sanborn, of
the Circuit Court of the Southern District of Iowa, says:
"No rule of construction, no course of proceeding, is more
helpful to a court, in rightfully interpreting a law, than to put
itself in the place of the legislative body which passed it, at the
time of its enactment, with a complete knowledge of the legislation on its subject at that time, and then to seek, in the light of
that legislation, the purpose for which it was passed and the evil
it was intended to remedy." 7
17S U. S. 414, 421.
S. 470.
*Ches. & Pot. Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238, 242-4; United States v.
Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 559-61.
'Lederer, CoIL v. Real Estate Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 295 Fed. 672 (C. C.
A. 3d, xz4), affirming 2g Fed. 265.
'Nork v. United States ex rel. Rives, 295 Fed. 225 (D. C. 19z4).
'Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, Col., 252 U. S. 523.
'In re Clerkship of Federal Court, go Fed. 248, 251.
'242 U.
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The thought thus expressed by Judge Sanborn has lately had the
approval of Mr. Chief Justice Taft.8 Legislative histories of Federal statutes may, therefore, be resorted to only in order to determine the intention of Congress when an ambiguous statute is
efore the court for construction. Since all parts of the legislative. history of a statute do not have equal weight, consideration
will be given to the extent to which the courts have resorted to
the various parts of these legislative histories.
The Constitution of the United States 9 provides that each
House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and by Section
895 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that certified copies of
.these journals shall have the same force and effect as the originals would have if produced and authenticate.t in court. The
Supreme Court has in a number of cases made use of these legisthe legislative intent of
lative journals in its effort to determine
10
an act before it for interpretation.
While technically speaking they are not a part of the legislative history of the statutes, extensive use may be made of confidentiWl preliminary drafts of bills, and of communications submitted to the various committees of Congress, even though they
are not contained in the committee hearings or reports on the
bill. These are available in the files of the committees which
considered the bill, and may also usually be found in the files of
the legislative counsel of the House and Senate, respectively,
where may generally be found the best legislative histories of
Federal statutes. To have such, materials readily accessible
serves not only to discourage declamations urging that the court
must seek the intent of Congress unaided save by the face of
the statute, but also to further the will of Congress and prevent
unnecessary, and often less expedient, judicial legislation. 1
It is not unusual for Congress. to enact legislation to remedy evils brought to its attention by means of petitions. In con' Stafford v. Vallace,

258 U. S. 495, 513.
'Art. i, sec. 5, ci. 3.
'Blake, Coll. v. National City Bank of N. Y., 23 Wall. 307; Field v.
Clark, i43 U. S. 649, 670; United States v. Burr, x59 U. S. 78.
"See 24 COL. I. R. 214, 215.
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struing the provisions of the Harter Act, 12 the Supreme Court in
The Delaware,'3 remarked that:
"The exigencies which lead to the passage of the Act are
graphically set forth in a petition addressed by the Glasgow Corn
Trade Association to the Marquis of Salisbury and embodied
in a report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives. As a part of the history
of*the'times this is a proper subject for consideration. American Net & T. Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474."
While the petition referred to in this case was embodied in the
committee report on the bill, there have been cases where petitions were referred to that were not so included in the committee
report. In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States ",the
court referred to the petitions presented to the committees of
Congress to show the evil the statute before it for interpretaion
sought to remedy, and in Ogden v. Strong 15 the court examined
the petition to Congress upon which the act was based, and
-which was made a part of the pleadings, in order to ascertain
more clearly the consideration and inducement for the act, so
as to determine whether the money paid under the act became a
part of an estate. However, in Thomas v. F. B. Vandegrift &
Co.'0 the court refused to consider a coniunicatiotnfrom a party
interested in a statute to the committee in charge thereof, it appearing to the court that Congress had disregarded the communication.
Much information of value to lawyers is to be found in
various legal memoranda and briefs prepared for the use of the
committees of Congress. These are sometimes prepared by
counsel for the various interests affected by the proposed legislation, and sometimes by the legislative counsel of the respective
houses of Congress. As an example of the latter there may be
cited a one hundred page "Law Memoranda Upon Civil Aero22
3

Stat. at L 445.

16x U. S. 459.

" 143 U. S. 457, 464.
%2 Paine 584, 588, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 46o (U. S. C. C.).
2 162 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d, igo8).
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nautics" printed for the use of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives. Sometimes these memoranda are bound into regular volumes, but always they may be found in the files of the committees considering the bill. In Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer1 7
the Supreme Court in its opinion (p. 534) made a marginal reference to "Briefs and Statements Filed With Senate Committee
on Finance on H. R. 3321, 66th Congress, ist Session, Vol 3,
pp. 1955-2094," but it does not clearly appear just what use the
court made of them. However, the District Court of New Jersey in Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Duffy,"' referring to this
action on the part of the Supreme Court, says:
"The marginal reference to briefs and statements filed with
the Senate Committee was merely to show that the alleged unwisdom and injustice of excluding one class of corporations from
a tax exemption clearly and deliberately allowed had been strongly
pressed upon Congress."
Following this statement that court lays down the rule that discussions before a Congressional committee, where no formal report is made in regard thereto, may not be used in determining
the meaning of a Congressional statute. Notwithstanding this
rule these briefs throw much light upon legal questions not readily obtainable elsewhere. In United States v. Union Pacific R.
Co."' it is recorded that the attorneys for the appellee filed "An
argument by Mr. R. B. Curtis before the Senate Judiciary Committee" but the court does not indicate in its opinion to what
extent, if any, this argument was relied upon or considered.
It is not infrequently the case, particularly as regards tariff
and revenue bills, that many preliminary drafts are made of
the bill before it is introduced in Congress. In interpreting
20
various statutes the Supreme Court has in a number of cases
" Supra, note 6.

"295 Fed. 881 (D. C. 1924).

.1b U. S. 72, 79.
'United States v. Pfitsch, supra, note 3; Penna. R. Co. v. Int. Coal

Min. Co.,
i, 20.

230

U. S. x84, 198-9; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S.
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made use of the preliminary drafts of the bill which later became
the statute being considered by it, but in Pine Hill Coal Co. v.
United States,21 Mr. Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said:
"It is a delicate business to base speculations about the purpose or construction of a statute upon the vicissitudes of its
passage."
The learned Mr. Dane, in his "Abridgment of American
Law," 22 observes that it is said in many English books that the
title of a statute is no part of it because the clerk adds it, but
that this reason does not hold in the United States, where the
legislature makes the title as much as the preamble or the body
of the statute. Although the title may not, strictly speaking, be
any part of it,
yet it may serve, in doubtful cases, to explain and
show the general purport of the act, and the inducement which
led to its enactment.
It2 is said by the Supreme Court in United States v. Fisher,

et aL, 3 that;

"Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and
in such case the title claims a degree of notice that will have its
due share of consideration."
Later, however, it was observed by that court that the title of
an act, especially Congressional legislation, furnishes little aid
iii the construction of it, because the body of the act in so many
cases has no reference to the matter specified in the title. 24 This
observation was somewhat modified later in Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States,2 5 where Mr. Justice Brewer said:
"Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the Legislature is the title of the Act. We
do not mean that it may be used to add to or take from the body
of the statute, but it may help in interpreting its meaning."
2 259 U. S. 191,

196.

I Vo. 6, p. 58, art. 5,see.

=2 Cranch 358, 386.

xx.

" Hadden v. Barney, Coll., 5 WaHl. Io7.
"Supra, note x4.
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A long line of uniform decisions of the Supreme Court seems
to fully sustain the right of the court to look at the title for the
purpose of ascertaining the intent of Congress, when the intent
is doubtful or obscure from the body of the act.
The changes made in the frame of the bill during the course
of passage have been referred to by the Supreme Court. In
United States v. St. Paul M. & M. R. Co., 26 Mr. Justice Pitney,
speaking for the Court, said that these "may very properly be
taken into consideration as throwing light upon the meaning of
the proviso."
'the hearings held by the committee to which a bill has been
referred are usually printed in full, and often contain much more
of value than the unacquainted would believe. In United States
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2 7 Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the
Court, said:
"But courts may, with propriety, in construing a statute,
recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is
frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as well as
the meaning of the particular provisions in it."
Following this rule, the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes
has often referred to the "Committee Hearings" upon the bills
in order to ascertain the history of the times and reasons for the
legislation. There are two outstanding instances where this has
been done.2 8 In Stafford v. Wallace 29 it appears that the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, in reporting the bill,
which'became the act there in question, referred to the testimony
printed in the House Committee Hearings 3 0 as showing the contemporaneous history and information of the evils to be remedied
upon which the bill was framed. In referring to this Mr. Chief
justice Taft (p. 513) said:
"247 U. S. 310, 31&
"Supra, note i9.

" Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, supra, note 14; Stafford
v. Wallace, supra, note 8.
* Supra, note &
'66th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee-on Agriculture, Vol. 22o-2 and 220-3.
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"It is helpful to us, in interpreting the effect and scope of
the act, in order to determine its validity, to know the conditions
undei which Congress acted."
These committee hearings frequently contain valuable briefs
and legal memoranda.3 1
After hearings are held and the bill has been considered
by the committee, a report is usually, though not always, 3 2 submitted. These committee reports have been used by the Supreme
Court .in numerous cases in order to determine the intent of
Congress in enacting the statute. 33 In Binns v. United States,"
Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, said:
s
. .we have examined the reports of the committees
of either body with a view of determining the scope of statutes
passed on the strength of such reports."
In delivering the opinion of the Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co.
z,. Stewart,35 Mr. Justice McReynolds said:
"Neither branch of Congress devoted much debate to the act
under consideration-altogether less than two pages of the Record. (65th Cong., pp. 7605, 7843). The Judiciary Committee. of
the House made no report; but a brief one by the Senate Judiciary Committee (which is copied in the opinion) probably indicates the general legislative purpose. And with this and accompanying circumstances, the words must be read." (Matter in
parenthesis supplied.)
These reports are not only valuable for the assistance they
render in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes, but often in
' For example, see "Tariff Information, 1921," pp. 4144-4163, containing

valuable brief by Judge Marion De Vries of the United States Court of
Customs Appeals, on the constitutionality of the flexible tariff provisions of
the Tariff Act, 1922.
' See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149.
'Blake, Coll. v. National City Bank of N. Y., supra, note io; Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, supra, note 14; Bate Refrigerating Co. v.
.Sulzberger, i57 U. S. 1, 42; Ches. & Pot. Tel. Co. v. Manning, supra, note
Binns v. United States.; 194 U. S. 486, 495; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.
78. 88-9; Caminetti v. United States, supra, note 2; United States v. St. Paul
M. & M. R. Co.. supra, note 26; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra,
note .2: Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; United States
v. Pfitsch, supra, note 3; Ozawa v. United States, 26o U. S. 178, 191.
'Supra, note 33.
"Supra, note 3-.
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-them will be found valuable briefs not to be found elsewhere.
The report of the House Committee on Agriculture on the socalled McNary-Haugen Bill 26 contains a fifty-page brief, prepared by the legislative counsel of the House and Senate, discussing the more important constitutional problems involved in
the bill. and indicating the constitutional bases for the various
provisions of the bill. Had this bill become a law this report
would have been invaluable to the lawyers presenting cases involving its constitutionality.
Occasionally Congress appoints special committees to perform some particular function. For example, a special committee was empowered by Congress to enter negotiations with the
Indians with a view to the ultimate creation of a state from the
lands embraced in what later became the Indian Territory. When
a statute relating to the Indian Territory came before the Supreme Court for construction in Woodward v. De Graffenried,37
the Court referred to the reports of this committee 38 and, speaking through Mr. Justice Pitney, said:
"So far as these reports antedate the legislation under inquiry they may of course be resorted to as aids to interpretation,
for the Commission was in a very real sense 'the eyes and ears'
of Congress in matters pertaining to the affairs in the Indian
Territory, and legislation was framed with a special regard
to its recommendations."
The reports of the conference committees appointed to adjust the differences between the two houses in bills that have
passed both houses come generally within the term "Committee
Reports" and likewise may be resorted to as aids in the construction of ambiguous statutes. In United States v. Pfitsch3 the
Supreme Court specifically referred to and relied upon the report of the conference committee made upon the act there under
consideration.
1House Report No. 631, 68th Cong., ist Sess.; on 11. R. 9033, 68th Cong.,
ist Sess.
"238 U..S. 2k4, 29&
" Annuil Reports of the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes.
"Supra, note 3.
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The debates in Congress do not stand upon so substantial a
footing as do the committee reports. In Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering 40 the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
justice Pitney, said:
"By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well
established that the debates in Congress expressive of the views
and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and
hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and
purpose of the law-making body."
The reason for the rule enunciated by Mr. justice Pitney
is well stated by the great Mr. Justice Story in Mitchell :v. Great
Works Milling etc. Co. 41 in these words:
"At the threshold of the aigument we are met with the
suggestion that when the act was before Congress the opposite
doctrine was then maintained in the House of Representatives,
and it was confidently stated that no such jurisdiction was conferred by the act as is now insisted- on. What passed in Congress upon the discussion of a bill can hardly become a matter
of strict judicial inquiry: and if it were, it could scarcely be
affirmed that the opinions of a few members, expressed either
way, are to be considered as the judgment of the whole house,
or even of a majority. But in truth, little reliance can or ought
to be placed upon such sources of interpretation of a statute. The
questions can be, and rarely are, there debated upon strictly legal
grounds, with a full mastery of the subject and of the rules of
interpretation. . . . Nor have there been wanting illustrious instances of great minds which, after they had, as legislators or commentators, reposed upon a short and hasty opinion, have deliberately withdrawn from their first impressions
when they came upon the judgment seat to re-examine the statute or law in its full bearings."
In Russell Motor Car Co. z. United States.4 2 Mr. Justice
Sutherland, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
'"Weare referred to the utterances of certain members of
Congress in debate, which, it is argued, show that the provision
' Supra. note 33.
24.
Story 648,653. Fed. Cas. No. 9662.
"-61 U. S. 514, 52a
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under consideration was meant to cover private contracts.
Whether they come within the rule forbidding resort to legislative debates, or uithin the exception (R. R. Comm. v. C. B. &
Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 588), we need not consider; .
(Italics mine.)
From the language used it would seem that the court considers
that an exception to the rule forbidding resort to legislative
debates was made in the Railroad Commission case. But an examination of that case does not confirm such interpretation, as
the court there referred to explanatory statements made by members in charge of the bill, which come under a different rule.
However, an exception to the rule announced in the Duplex Printing Co. case was apparently made in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States 43 where the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
White, said:
"Although debates may not be used as a -means of interpreting a statute, that rule, in the nature of things, is not violated by resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of the enactment of a particular law; that
is the history of the period when it was adopted."
Citing the Standard Oil case and the cases of Johnson v.

Southern Pacific Co.4 4 and Lincoln v. United States,45 the
Court in Acklin v. Peoples Say. Assn. 4" said:
"While, generally speaking, construction of a statute may
not be aided by consideration of discussions in the legislature,
yet, when it is seen that the legislation was had with special attention given to the effect of the disputed language, that cogitation by participating members which served to affect the result may be resorted to for definitive purposes. Such is the
-rule where obscurity in a statute is to be cleared."
And the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is apparently of the opinion tfiat recourse may be had to debates in Con4 221 U. S. 1.
'.Supra, note 2.
U

202 U. S. 44.
,93 Fed. 39o, 397 (D. C.,

1923).
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tpretatcn of an
ous statute. In Work v. United States ex r.el. Rives"4- the late
Mr. Chief Justice Smyth. in delivering the opinion of the court,
said:
"While reference may be made to reports of committees of
either House, and even to debates in Congress for the purpose
of aiding in the interpretation of an ambiguous measure (United
States v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 247 U. S. 31o, 38), there
is no authority for considering those sources of information
where, as here, there is no ambiguity."

_,,yg,.

The rule with reference to the use of debates in Congress is
applied in the construction of constitutions as well as statutes.4.
In the course of the debates in Congress attendant upon
the consideration of a bill it frequently happens that explanatory statements in the nature of supplemental reports are made
by the member of the committee in charge of the bill in the
course of passage. The rule that reports of committees of the
House or Senate may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative intent, in a case where otherwise the meaning of the stat'ute is obscure, has been extended to include those explanatory
statements! 9 But in Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. . Interstate
Commerce Commission 50 the Supreme Court held this rule did
not apply to the statements of the chairman of the committee.
And, in De Laski & Thropp CircularWoven Tire Co. v. Iredell,
Coll.,5" the opinion of the court indicates that it did not very
strongly rely upon a statement made by the chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee of the House made during the
course of the debate upon a revenue act then before the court
Supra, note 5.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 254.
Binns v. United States, supra, note 33; Pa. R. Co. v. Int. Coal Min.
Co., supra, note 2o; United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U. S. 265, 28;
United States v. St. Paul M. & M. R. Co., supra, note 26; Duplex Printing
.Press"Co. v. Deering, supra, note 33.
a.230 U. S. 324, 333-4.
268 Fed. 377 (D. C, x92o).
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for consideration. However, in some recent cases 12 the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has relied upon statements of the chairmen of committees of the House made in the
course of debates upon statutes before the court for interpretation.
A more general use of the legislative history of statutes as
an aid in determining the legislative intent will serve to materially lessen judicial legislation.
Clarence A. Miller.
Washington, D. C.
' 1 New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. United States, 297 Fed. 158, i6o
(C. C. A., 1924); United States cx rel. Patton v. Tod, 2W Fed. 385 (C. C. A.,
1924).

